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or not they are adhérents of this sect. The only Islamist
organisation that is currently represented in Kazakhstan
is Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). This is not a Wahhabi sect in thé
strict sensé of the term.
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT)
Hizb ut-Tahrir (transliterated in various forms and usually
translatée as thé Liberation Party) is a transnational Islamist
organization. Initially, Uzbekistan was the primary focus of
HT activities in Central Asia (see Uzbekistan entry). HT
opérâtes clandestinely, since it is banned in all the Central
Asian states, Since the late 1990s it bas been spreadmg
beyond the borders of Uzbekistan and now bas some adhér-
ents in Kazakhstan. Some commentators suggest that it
attracts followers mainly from thé Uzbek minority. Smce
2001, at least two dozen HT members have been arrested in




Capital: Nairobi Population: 32 m
Kenya achieved indépendance from thé United
Kingdom in 1963, and was proclaimed a republic thé
following year. In thé 1960s the ruling Kenya African
National Union (KANU) effectively became thé sole
légal party, with its status as thé only légal political
organization embedded in thé Constitution from 1982.
Daniel arap Moi succeeded Jomo Kenyatta as
Président and KANU party leader in 1978.
By the start of the 1990s (and in line with contem-
porary démocratie developments in much of Africa)
there was mounting pressure within Kenya for
KANU's monopoly on power to be ended. On May 3,
1990, former cabinet ministers Charles Rubia and
Kenneth Matiba called a press conference to demand
thé introduction of multi-partyism. Saba Saba (seven
seven), i.e. July 7, 1990, was the starting point of one
week of urban riots that became the symbol of this
challenge. After 18 months of mass mobilization in
combination with pressure from the international com-
munity (including the suspension of multilateral aid
after several révélations of high level corruption and
possible involvement of State House officials in the
killing of former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert
Ouko, found murdered in February 1990, and other
prominent opponents of the Moi regime), section 2(A)
of the Constitution was repealed on Dec. 3, 1991,
enabling the return to multi-partyism by January 1992.
The multi-party System allowed discontent with the
Kenyan authorities to surface in legal channels to the
detriment of underground movements such as
Mwakenya (a mainly university-based group active in
the 1980s), which faded out. Among the last actions by
Mwakenya was the issuing of a statement "Kenya
Democracy Plank" after the Saba Saba struggles.
Initially, by August 1991, the opposition came
together in an alliance known as the Forum for the
Restoration of Democracy (FORD). In December
1991 Mwai Kibaki resigned as Minister of Health and
founded the Democratie Party (DP). Several other new
political parties registered successfully. However, in
spite of this new political freedom, at least six parties
were denied registration, most notably the Islamic
Party of Kenya (IPK), led by Sheikh Khalid Salim
Balala (see below). Other parties banned included the
Green Party and the DEMO (Democratie Movement)
of Ngonya wa Gakonya's religieus group "Tent of the
Living God". Following a split in FORD over its
future direction and leadership, the opposing factions
registered as separate parties in October 1992; FORD-
Asili, led by Kenneth Matiba, and FORD-Kenya, led
by Oginga Odinga.
On Dec. 29, 1992, Kenya held its first multi-party
élection since 1966 and the first direct élection of its
President. Eight presidential candidates and 10 politi-
cal parties contested the presidency and a total of 188
parliamentary seats. President Moi was declared the
winner of the presidential contest with 37 per cent of
the vote. KANU took just under 30 per cent of the vote
in the legislative contest but, as a result of the first-
past-the-post électoral System, won 100 parliamentary
seats, leaving 88 for the combined opposition. There
were widespread reports of électoral malpractice in
favour of KANU candidates.
Following the 1992 defeat, the political opposition
lost much of its momentum. KANU grew even
stronger by luring opposition MPs back to the ruling
party. Among the most notable defectors was Ngonya
wa Gakonya, the political and the spiritual leader of
DEMO. His followers feit so betrayed that they sought
to kill him. (Wa Gakonya was later to work bis way
back into FORD-Asili and ultimately Saba-Saba
Asilï). FORD-Kenya leader Oginga Odinga died in
January 1994 and the party's leadership was taken
over by Kijana Wamalwa. More wrangles over its
leadership led Gitobu Imanyara and Paul Muite to
leave the party. By December 1996 also Raila Odinga
(Oginga Odinga's son) left the party for the National
Development Party (NDP). FORD-Asili split prior to
the 1997 élections into (the unregistered) Saba-Saba
Asili (Matiba) and FORD-People led by Kimani wa
Nyoike.
Besides continuing restrictions on political parties
(by 1994 almost 30 parties had been denied registra-
tion), the Kenyan authorities continued to harass indi-
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vidual politicians, journalists and activists. Many
opposition politicians such as Raila Odinga, Paul
Muite, Martin Shikuku, and Sheikh Khalid Balala,
among others, were arrested during 1993 and subsé-
quent years and kept in jail for periods ranging trom a
few days to several weeks. Most notorious, however,
was the treatment of Koigi wa Wamwere, a former
member of parliament. While in exile in Norway from
1986 ne founded thé Kenya Patriotic Front (KPF,
which ceased to exist after thé partial legalization of
parties in 1991). In September 1990, Wamwere was
abducted by Kenyan security agents in Uganda, and
brought to Kenya. Kenyan officiais, however,
announced that hè had been captured in a Nairobi sub-
urb with a cache of arms. He spent two and a half
years in custody only for the state to drop treason
charges facing him and two others. He was released
shortly after thé 1992 élections only to be re-arrested
(with family members) in November 1993 and after an
18-month trial was sentenced to four years' imprison-
ment for attempted robbery. International observers at
his trial concluded that the prosecution had fabricated
thé évidence against him. The defence team lodged
appeals in December 1995, and he was granted bail in
December 1996 on médical grounds, as were his two
associâtes. In December 1997 the Chief Justice
quashed Wamwere's four-year jail sentence and
dropped ail charges against him and his two co-defen-
dants. In 2002, he was elected to parliament on a
NaRC ticket.
The politically motivated violence that had affected
particularly thé so-called opposition zones within thé
Rift Valley province since thé end of 1991 returned by
early 1993, and erupted with renewed force towards
thé end ofthat year. It was estimated that at least 1,500
Kenyans, mostly Kikuyu, were killed and 300,000
internally displaced. Allégations that thé Kenyan gov-
ernment had promoted this violence were confirmed
by thé report of a parliamentary commutée in 1992.
Similar politically motivated clashes erupted before
and after thé 1997 élections.
Alongside thé création of new parties, a range of
new civic organizations was established, mostly by
lawyers, sometimes assisted with international donor
funding, in thé early 1990s. These included the Kenya
Human Rights Commission (KHRC), thé Institute for
Education in Democracy (IED), Release Political
Prisoners (RPP), and thé Centre for Law and Research
International (CLARION). Muite's Mwangaza Trust
was deregistered but resurfaced in 1995 as Safina, "thé
ark" ki Kiswahili, a would-be political party, led by
the internationally known archaeologist Richard
Leakey and Paul Muite. Safina only obtained official
registration on Nov. 26, 1997, one month before thé
1997 général élection.
For those who could not be bought or compromised
in any scandai KANU had kept the heavy stick of its
Provincial Administration, General Service Unit
(GSU) and other branches of its political police.
Leakey, Muite and others were beaten by KANU
youths, when they made an attempt to visit Koigi wa
Wamwere in September 1995 in Nakuru. In other inci-
dents government opponents paid with their lives
(e.g., Karimi Nduthu of Release Political Prisoners).
In thé period following thé 1992 élections, thé civil
society organizations, especially those that had warned
thé opposition parties to press for légal and constitu-
tional changes first before going to the polls, took over
the debate. On Nov. 2, 1994, the Law Society of
Kenya, thé International Commission of Jurists
(Kenyan Chapter) and thé Kenya Human Rights
Commission publicly presented thé draft of a model
Constitution ("The Kenya We Want"), in which they
proposed a more complète framework for a démocrat-
ie multi-party System. With thé (moral) support of the
Catholic Church and of thé NCCK, thé umbrella
organization of the Protestant Churches, thé debate
became thé central public issue. The steering comrmt-
tee of thé conférence transformed itself into thé
Citizens' Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs)
and Moi promised a constitutional review in his
(1995) New Year's message to thé people. The 4Cs,
though, did not yet hâve a strategy on how to sustain
thé debate as a resuit of heavy wrangling with the
opposition parties over supremacy over the campaign
and thé 4Cs time-consuming approach needed for a
nation-wide debate on constitutional reform. With the
pressure for reform easing, Moi, on June 1, 1995,
ruled out any major changes to thé Constitution.
Moreover, by the beginning of that year fear and con-
fusion had returned prominently after Moi's
announcement that a revolutionary group, thé
February Eighteenth Movement (FEM), wanted to
forcefully overthrow his government through their
military arm, the February Eighteenth
Revolutionary Army (FERA) led by "Brigadier"
John Odongo (see below).
From June 1995 to April 1997 the issue of consti-
tutional reform did not feature prominently in thé
news. Quietly, however, progress was made with
regard to civic éducation, in which thé need for con-
stitutional reform was one of the central issues. By thé
end of 1996 civil society actors, under thé umbrella of
thé National Convention Executive Committee
(NCEC) had been able to outmaneuver thé opposition
parties in thé leadership of the reform initiative.
Through regulär street démonstrations they demanded
Substantive reforms before thé élections. The con-
frontation culminated at the end of August when Moi
accused the NCEC of preparing a "civilian coup".
The political elite - including many of those who
had been at the forefront of the crusade for political
reform - acquiesced in KANU's political maneuvers.
Minimal reforms were agreed upon by September
1997, ending a period of turmoil. Ten new political par-
ties were registered and three rejected. Some minimal
improvements were also realized in the composition of
the Electoral Commission, access to public media and
in the ability of opposition parties to hold rallies. Yet
the institutional bias in combination with élection vio-
lence and fraud enabled KANU to win the December
1997 élections, taking 107 of the 210 élective seats in
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the legislative élections while President Moi won with
40.2 per cent of the vote in a 15-way presidential con-
test.
After thé élections, Moi and KANU insisted that the
constitutional reform process should be exclusively in
the hands of elected parliamentarians. Only after con-
tinued protests and protracted negotiations did KANU
agrée, in principle, to the inclusion of civil society
groups in the reform process. The Constitutional
Review Commission, headed by Yash Pal Ghai, hand-
ed in a first draft by September 2002, too late to be
implemented before the 2002 élections.
After the 1997 élections, KANU's tiny majority in
Parliament was quickly reinforced by roughly three
dozen MPs from Raila Odinga's NDR By June 2000
Raila Odinga and bis NDP colleagues accepted places
in the Kenyan government, hitherto reserved for
KANU ministers only. This collaboration fïnally
resulted in a merger of KANU and NDP in March
2002 and the rise of "New KANU". Yet this move was
the beginning of the end of KANU's uninterrupted
rule since independence. The main battleground
became the issue of succession to President Moi.
Finance Minister Simeon Nyachae left the party after
angering President Moi for rightly predicting publicly
that the government would go bankrupt. Nyachae left
to become FORD-People's presidential candidate. His
example was followed in October 2002 after the offi-
cial appointaient of Uhuru Kenyatta (son of Jomo
Kenyatta) as KANU's flag bearer. This move angered
Odinga and a number of other leading party members,
who moved to the Liberal Democratie Party (LDP).
They again formed a coalition with Kibaki (DP),
Michael Wamalwa (FORD-K) and Charity Ngilu
(NPK) in the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC).
NaRC carried the day in the December 2002 élections
by taking 125 seats, against 64 for KANU. NaRC's
single presidential candidate, Mwai Kibaki, trounced
Uhuru Kenyatta by garnering 62.3 per cent of the vote
against 31.2 per cent for Kenyatta.
The new cabinet included a number of former
exiled or jailed opponents of the Moi government.
Torture chambers used by the Moi government were
opened after the élections for the Kenyan public to
witness. Also, violence erupted when members of the
Mungiki sect (see below) who had supported Uhuru
Kenyatta's candidature, harassed local résidents in the
Molo région. The new government cracked down
upon thé Mungiki group instantly. The coming years
will tell if this dissident movement will return to its
original religieus roots or stick to its more récent polit-
ical and banditry opérations.
The incoming Kibaki government faced huge éco-
nomie problems, with thé coffee, tea, rice, dairy and
sugar industries in total disarray, marred by misman-
agement, corruption and thé violent actions of desper-
ately impoverished farmers. The tourism sector has
also been hard hit, especially after the Aug. 7, 1998,
bomb blast, thought to have been carried out by
Maslim/Al-Qaeda extremists from outside the coun-
try, that destroyed the US embassy and neighboring
buildings, killing 213 people (see below). The
chances of recovery for the tourism industry were fur-
ther reduced when on Nov. 28, 2002, the Hotel
Paradise, located some 20 km north of Mombasa and
at the time crowded with Israeli tourists, was car
bombed. Ten Kenyans, three Israelis and three suicide
bombers were killed in the blast at the hotel. Al-
Qaeda claimed responsibility for this suicide bomb-
ing as well for the simultaneous failed attempt to
bring down an Israeli jetliner, carrying 261 tourists, as
it took off from Mombasa airport.
Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK)
Sheikh Balala (born 1958), the unofficial leader of the
Islamic Party of Kenya and a lecturer on Islamic religion,
became populär among the (Muslim) youth and poor people
due to his sermons and démonstrations against the govern-
ment. He stressed the "marginalization" of the Muslim com-
munity in Kenyan society. The IPK aligned itself politically
with the FORD-Kenya party in the 1992 général élection and
helped it to win two parliamentary seats in Mombasa. In
1993 the IPK was involved in anti-government démonstra-
tions and clashes with the police, with numerous arrests of
its supporters, and fought street battles with its rival, the
United Muslims of Africa (UMA). The IPK claimed that
hired UMA thugs had gone on the rampage in IPK strong-
holds, backed by the police, to intimidate its supporters. This
claim was confirmed by the Suprême Council of Kenya
Muslims (Supkem), which in the past had spoken strongly
against the IPK's programme, saying the party sought the
formation of a théocratie state in Kenya. The UMA had been
starled by well-connected KANU politicians and had heavy
government backing. The UMA was virtually dissolved by
February 1994, however.
Sheikh Balala was stripped of his citizenship in
November 1994 while on a visit to Germany. He returned to
Kenya on July 12, 1997. On arrivai, his identity card and his
expired passport were confiscated. Sheikh Balala was arrest-
ed just prior to the December 1997 élections, for claiming
that President Moi had rigged the élection process and incit-
ing people not to vote, and again in June 1998 on rurther
charges of incitement, at which time he was remanded in
custody for 10 weeks before being released on Aug. 21,
1998. In October 1998 the IPK caused uproar in Zambia
where it planned to register a party. Balala had said that
southern African countries had "adopted western styles of
living and governing", making them a fertile ground to
propagate Islam. Balala's comments enraged Zambia's
Christian leaders.
Balala was only given back his identity card and allowed
to register as a voter in 2002, after which hè declared his
candidature for the Green Party of Kenya in the December
2002 élections. In the end, however, hè stood on a Shirikisho
ticket and garnered only 3 per cent of the votes in Mvita con-
stituency, just ahead of Sheikh Juma Ngao who represented
what remained of the unregistered Islamic Party of Kenya
and stood on a FORD-People ticket.
The IPK's declining support reflected the continuing
déniai of registration to the IPK and the impact of events
such as the bombing of the US embassy.
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February Eighteenth Movement (FEM)/February
Eighteenth Résistance Army (FERA)
A group of Kenyan rebels named themselves the "Febraary
Eighteenth Movement" (FEM) and its military arm the
"Febraary Eighteenth Resistance Army" (FERA) on Feb. 18,
1991, thé 34th anniversary of thé hanging by thé British
colonial government of Mau Mau freedom fighter Dedan
Kimathi. From the late 1980s to early 1990s onwards young,
jobless Kenyans were recruited for FEM/FERA under thé
pretext that they could find employment in Uganda. Instead
they were trained in a camp in Sono in Mbale district, north-
ern Uganda, preparing to overthrow thé Kenyan govern-
ment. Some of them went for further training in Libya and
North Korea. FERA was composed of cells named after
prominent dead Kenyans (e.g., Muliro, Ouko, Muge).
Patrick Kimingich Wangamati, former chairman of
Webyue Town Council, was identified as thé political leader
of FEM. He had reportedly fled to Uganda in the wake of the
murder of former Bungoma mayor, Henry Wakwabubi, in
1993. At the time of his disappearance Wangamati, in his late
50s, was a staunch FORD-Kenya supporter who, in 1992
sought the party nomination to run in Sirisia constituency.
FERA was led by a "Brigadier" John Odongo (also
known by a variety of aliases), who had been living in self-
imposed exile abroad since thé 1960s. The Kenya
Broadcasting Corporation and the government-owned news-
paper Kenya Times claimed that FERA was founded with the
support of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's National
Resistance Movement (NRM). Odongo had strong links
with the NRM and moved up in the ranks of the National
Resistance Army in 1986 in récognition of his contribution
to the NRM. These sources also claimed that a high-ranking
NRM official had drafted a blue print entitled "Ten ways
towards the removal of Moi", on behalf of FERA. The
Kenya Times newspaper claimed that FERA operatives had
taken an oath in April 1994, shortly after the assassinations
—-of Présidents Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryiamira of
Burundi, to bind their forces and those of an organization
called Mouvement Nationale Congolaise-Lumumba to over-
throw the governments of Présidents Moi of Kenya and
Mobutu of Zaire.
In reply, President Museveni said that hè had known
Odongo since 1972 but denied that his government was sup-
porting FERA. Révélations from FERA fîghters later
showed that the assurance that the Ugandan NRM would
fight alongside FERA to remove the regime in Kenya was
dropped after Moi agreed by mid-1991 to multi-party élec-
tions. Morale among many FERA fighters was low by mid-
1992 and a number of them made use of the genera! amnesty
announced by Moi that same year for all who had fled
abroad for political reasons. They were asked to return. The
Kenyan Special Branch interrogated some of them and col-
lected information from the retumees, initially by false
promises and later by torture. Thus the Kenyan government
was well aware of FERA/FEM's existence and its strength,
or rather weakness, by that time.
On Oct. 30, 1994, a shoot out occurred between some 30
FERA members and the police in the Mt Elgon région. The
group's mission was to attack and seize more arms from the
Kenyan police. According to the Kenyan government five
rebels and two policemen died. The Kenyans sought and
found refugee status in Uganda.
A number of people were arrested and severely tortured
between October 1994 and November 1995. Estimâtes are
that in total some 50 Kenyans were taken to court and some
20 persons were convicted and sentenced to up to six years
imprisonment In addition, a number of Kenyans alleged to
be linked to the movement never appeared before a court but
were moved from one police station to another for periods
ranging from a week up to several months. Almost all the
people who appeared in court originated from Bungoma
District in Western Province. Most of them were FORD-
Kenya supporters in their early twenties. A number of stu-
dent leaders and lawyers were also tortured in an attempt to
make them sign confessions that they belonged to
FEM/FERA. They were also questioned extensively about
their alleged relations with political leaders as Paul Muite
and Raila Odinga. In the end none of them was convicted.
One detainee was awarded Ksh. 500,000 in compensation m
May 2003 after hè sued the government over his illegal
détention in 1995.
President Moi officially revealed the existence of
FEM/FERA in February 1995, one reason for the public dis-
closure being Uganda's refusai to extradite Odongo.
President Moi also claimed that the guerrilla group had the
backing and fmancial support of me Kenyan opposition,
reinforcing an announcement he had made on Jan. 8 that the
opposition was planning to start what hè termed "urban
guerrilla warfare". KANU politicians and supporters
marched the streets demonstrating against Odongo and
Wangamati and calling for the arrest and prosecution of
opposition politicians.
The Kenyan government even implicated the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
UNHCR border points were alleged to be used as bases by
conspirators plotting against the Kenyan government. The
refusai by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to assist
in repatriating Odongo resulted in a threat by President Moi
to expel the estimated 230,000 refugees (most from Somalia
and Sudan) in camps on Kenyan territory.
John Odongo and Patrick Wangamati were arrested by
the Ugandan authorities and sent in March 1995 into exile m
Ghana. From Ghana, Odongo continued to claim hè would
overthrow the Kenyan government and accused the Kenyan
authorities of killing and secretly burying his men. The last
heard about Odongo was in September 1999 when a Kenyan
refugee in Uganda, Raphaël Osumba, claiming to have starl-
ed a new rebel group and to be a lieutenant and nephew of
John Odongo, requested to be moved to Ghana to rejoin his
uncle. However, the UNHCR rejected Osumba's request for
relocation.
Patrick Wangamati returned to Kenya on Oct. 6,1997. He
was interrogated and detained for almost nine weeks, and par-
doned in December 1997. He announced publicly that FERA
had been officially dissolved. In 2002 hè unsuccessfully
sought the KANU nomination as a parliamentary candidate
Al-Qaeda and Kenya
The Arab dominated Islande Party of Kenya (IPK, see
entry) has been identified as the most radical among
thé Muslim Community of Kenya. However, it has
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worked primarily through speeches and démonstra-
tions, reflecting the view that Kenya's potential for
violent religious extremism is low, since most Kenyan
Muslims are moderate and tolerant. Until the late
1990s, Kenya mainly had to deal with local Muslim
Somali-Kenyan bandits, known as Shiftas, operating
in thé North-Eastern Province and preying primarily
on thé local population and tourists. Kenya has, how-
ever, since then been the victim of well-organized
externally directed attacks on its soil, aimed at
American or Israeli targets, but killing hundreds and
wounding thousands of Kenyans.
The attackers in the bombing of the US^embassy
(August 1998) and the Paradise hotel (November
2002) were predominantly outside terrorists, from
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who had entered the country
a few months or even only days before thé assault. Yet
they did get support from a few Kenyans. For thé
embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, four
people were sentenced to life imprisonment by May
2001. Another 12 persons, including Osama bin Laden
were indicted for thèse attacks in December 1998.
Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, alias Abdul Karim, thé
alleged leader of thé Kenya embassy bombing, has so
far eluded capture. This alias was the one he used to
marry a local teenage girl on Dec. 30, 2001, when he
was teaching at an Islamic school in Lamu. On May
14, 2003, in the wake of a car bomb attack in Saudi
Arabia, thé Kenyan National Security Minister Chris
Murungaru warned of a possible attack by Al-Qaeda
in Kenya and released a picture of Fazul Abdullah
Mohammed claiming he plies between Nairobi and
Mogadishu in Somalia and might be in Kenya.
Subsequently Britain and thé USA issued travel bans
to Kenya and the UK even banned flights to Nairobi
by its airlines, fearing they might be brought down by
terrorists. The US ambassador, accusing thé Kenyan
government of not doing enough to fight terrorism,
decided to close down his embassy on June 20, 2003,
over what was termed "new information concerning
possible terrorist activity in Kenya".
Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan and Fahid
Mohammed Ally Msalam have been indicted in thé
1998 bombings. Both were born in Mombasa. Sheikh
Swedan was most likely captured on July 11, 2002, in
Karachi and handed over to thé FBI. An unnamed US
intelligence officiai, though, could not confirm detailed
reporting by thé Guardian newspaper over this case.
Fahid Msalam was mentioned by an Israeli source as
one of thé three suicide bombers who attacked thé
Hôtel Paradise. In March 2003, Abikar Mohamed Ali,
a trader in electrical goods carrying Yemeni and South
African passports, was arrested in Mogadishu where he
had been staying for about a year. He was said to be a
mid-level Al-Qaeda operative suspected of having
played a rôle in both thé 1998 bombings and more
récent attacks in East Africa. From June to September
2003 six people, ail Kenyans of Arab origin, were
arrested and charged by thé Kenyan authorities in con-
nection with thé Paradise hôtel bombing.
Al-Qaeda activities were also recorded in
September 2002 when another Al-Qaeda suspect from
Yemen, Hassan Omar Hussein, was arrested trying to
get into Kenya. He was said to be planning to use a
false Kenyan identity. A Kenyan, Mubarak Salim
Mubarak, was accused of helping him and was released
on bail. It is feared that with Al-Qaeda hunted out of
Afghanistan attention will be redirected towards other
régions, such as the East African coastal zone.
In early 2003 Kenya joined a group of six countries
identifïed by the USA to work in a coalition in the bat-
tle against terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The new
government will have to work hard to convince the
world that that it is no longer possible to bribe the
immigration départaient. It was alleged in August
1999 that this corruption had eased tremendously the
work of the terrorists, some of mem having left the
country with Kenyan passports. The lure for financial
gain had also been shown in February 1999, when
Kenyan intelligence services sold off Kurdish rebel
leader Abdullah Ocalan to the Turkish government,
after being tipped off by Israeli intelligence of his
présence in the country. Rumors circulated that the
Turkish government had paid a "delivery fee" of Ksh.
270 million to State House and security individuals.
Mungiki ("United People")
The origin of this religious-political movement is debated,
reflecting its dual character. Some see it as essentially a
revival of orthodox traditional cultural values and practices,
like female circumcision, in rejection of Western culture.
Others stress its political dimension and link Mungiki to the
Mau Mau rébellion against British colonial rule in the 1950s.
One of the Mungiki founders, Ndura Waruinge, is a grandson
of General Waruinge, a Mau Mau fighter. In particular,
Mungiki, like the Mau Mau, in the majority draws its sup-
porters form the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest tribal group,
accounting for 20 per cent of the population. Moi, in con-
trast, was from the Kalenjin group, and had built much of his
political strategy on a policy of combining the other tribal
groups against the Kikuyu, who had dominated under
(Kikuyu) Jomo Kenyatta. Those Kikuyu who had become
victims of state-sponsored violence under Moi, which made
them lose their land and property during the clashes in the
1991-2001 period (killing some 4,000 people and displacing
600,000 others) became a huge following. Later, éléments of
the urban poor and non-Kikuyu are said to have joined
Mungiki. It is estimated that by 2002 Mungiki had between
1.5 and 2 million dues-paying members, mostly youth
between the age of 18 and 35 and some 20 per cent being
women.
Mungiki took part in revenge attacks aimed at the Moi
government, as well as resettling victims. In the mid-1990s
members were regularly arrested and tortured by the author-
ities but it was only by November 1998 that Mungiki's activ-
ities surfaced prominently. That month Molo MP Kihika
Kimani held a rally in Nakuru where 61 alleged members of
the Mungiki sect apologized to President Moi over their tak-
ing an illegal oath. It was Kimani who until then had been
seen as the main mobilizer of Kikuyu activities in conflict
areas. Also, Mungiki made headlines after they commenced
a campaign in urban areas against drunkenness, drug addic-
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tion, criminal activities, prostitution, etc.
In September 2000, 13 Mungiki leaders converted to the
radical Shiite order of Kenyan Muslims, politically united in
the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK). (Most Kenyan Muslims
adhère to the Sunni branch of Islam.) In November 2001
Ndura (now Ibrahim) Waruinge was detained for a short
period after declaring that the Mungiki would paralyze the
transport system within Nairobi should police interfère with
their bid to take over the management of all private taxi
routes around the city to ensure that priées would remain
affordable for the poor. While such efforts have been
immensely successful in some cases, similar efforts in other
parts of the city ended in blood baths as Mungiki youths
clashed with entrenched cartels. It has been claimed that
these takeovers were foremost instigated because they
formed an important source of income for the movement as
it has been for others.
The Kenyan government outlawed the sect briefly on
March 3,2002, after a gang of some 300 Mungiki vigilantes
slaughtered 23 opponents in Kariobangi, Nairobi. Another
seventeen groups, mostly linked to prominent politicians,
were banned. However, Mungiki continued to operate wide-
ly, despite the ban. After the merger of KANU and NDP on
March 8,2002, Mungiki came out in support of the party and
its leading group of "Young Turks" (Sunkuli, Kenyatta,
Jirongo).
/ Scholars like Peter Kagwanja have noted the phenome-
' non of the Ituika ("break") system, an old Kikuyu ceremony
last held in 1902 and banned by the British in 1935, where
political power was handed over from the old to the young
génération. The Mungiki accused the old génération of over-
staying their time in power, at the expense of the next gén-
ération. The 2002 élection, Mungiki leader Maina Njenga
stated, should result in the older (Moi and Kibaki généra-
tion) handing over power to the younger (Uhuru Kenyatta)
génération. Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu), 41, named
kamwana (the youth) by Mungiki, was seen as the fulfïll-
ment of a Kikuyu prophecy that a young man would rise and
support the people in their hour of need. On Aug. 20, 2002,
the day of Uhuru's nomination as a presidential candidate,
Mungiki youth came in their thousands to celebrate his can-
didature for the presidency. However, after Uhuru Kenyatta
was accused of being the leader of Mungiki, Kenyatta
denounced the group stating they were tarnishing his name.
Maina Njenga himself stood on a KANU ticket in
Laikipia and trounced his opponent during the KANU pn-
maries. Yet the party did not ex.cept his candidature and
replaced him, possibly because of growing calls on the rul-
ing party from both in and outside parliament to stop pro-
tecting the Mungiki's unlawful activities. After the élections
it was revealed that the sect had been given at least one Land
Rover, out of 10 irregularly acquired army vehicles, by
KANU for its 2002 campaign.
This could not prevent Uhuru's and KANU's élection
defeat in December 2002. Many Mungiki youth considered
Kibaki's win a political loss and a generational loss as well
(Kibaki being in his 70s). It triggered post-élection violence
between Mungiki followers and the Kibaki government. In
early January 2003, Mungiki followers killed some thirty,
mainly Kikuyu, people in Nakuru, Nairobi, and Maragua.
The Kenya government issued a "shoot-to-kill' order to stop
Mungiki followers. Hundreds of Mungiki followers were
arrested, which forced many followers to go underground
and to threaten war. After protests from human rights organ-
izations over the "shoot-to-kill" order, the government aban-
doned this policy. Instead, it adopted a two-pronged strategy
of punishing criminality on the one hand and rehabilitating
Mungiki members on the other. This approach halted the
orgy of bloodshed by March 2003.
Marcel Rutten
Kiribati
Capital: Tarawa Population: 94,000
Kiribati (previously the Gilbert Islands) was granted
self-rule by the UK in 1971 and complete independ-
ence as a republic within the Commonwealth on July
12, 1979. It has an executive President heading a
Cabinet, and a House of Assembly of 41 members, of
whom 39 are elected by universal adult suffrage for a
four-year term, with one ex-officio member and one
nominated to represent the now Fiji-based Banaban
population.
A dispute over the island of Banaba, whose inhabi-
tants had in 1980 campaigned for the séparation of
Banaba from Kiribati or for self-government for the
Banabans on Banaba, was settled in April 1982 by an
agreement providing for compensation to be paid to
the Banabans, with the island remaining part of
Kiribati. The original settlers of Banaba were relocat-
ed to Rabi Island in Fiji in the 1940s when their island
was used for phosphate mining by the British
Phosphate Commission.
The first political party, the Christian Democratie
Party, was formed in September 1985 by opponents of
the government's décision to extend fishing rights to
the Soviet Union (this agreement being terminated in
October 1986). Over the years, at least two other polit-
ical parties came into existence.
Within the last two years, Kiribati has gone through
dramatic political changes, which have caused a cer-
tain degree of destabilization. The élection in
November 2002 saw the démise of President Teburoro
Tito's parliamentary dominance. His party, the
Manaeban Te Mauri ("Protect the Manaeba") won 16
seats, the main opposition Boutokanto Koaava ("Pillar
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